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Abstract
To understand decision-making, it is important to determine the degree to which
individuals are confident in making choices. In place of self-reported confidence state-
ments, on which most studies have relied, this study examines an incentivized measure
to elicit quantitative decision confidence theoretically and experimentally. We demon-
strate the feasibility of this measure in a setting where individuals are allowed to choose
randomization probabilities for two options according to which they may receive ei-
ther option. Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that individuals randomize when
they are not 100% confident about their choices, and the randomization probability
reveals their level of decision confidence. We tested this inference in an experiment
that elicited both confidence statements and randomization probability from our sub-
jects. Our experimental results provide strong evidence that one could interpret the
randomization probability for an option as the probabilistic confidence of choosing
that option.
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1 Introduction
Although they are ignored in standard economics, there are many important life decisions
that people are unable to make with full confidence. This is because many choices involve
trade-offs between conflicting objectives, and resolving these trade-offs is difficult. Studies
have increasingly shown that decision confidence – or the lack of it – has the potential to
explain a wide range of anomalies, such as the WTA-WTP gap (Dubourg et al., 1994),
preference reversals (Butler and Loomes, 2007), stochastic choices (Agranov and Ortoleva,
2017), insensitivity to variation in probabilities (Enke and Graeber, 2019), and many other
violations of standard decision theory (Butler and Loomes, 2011). The widespread influence
of confidence on decision-making and behaviour suggests that policy design should account
for decision confidence in order to improve decision-making and social welfare.1
Given the important role of decision confidence in decision-making, there is increasing
interest in its elicitation. Most existing studies have elicited decision confidence using
non-incentivized self-reported confidence statements. For example, Dubourg et al. (1994,
1997) allowed subjects to indicate whether they were unsure of their choices. Butler and
Loomes (2007) and Butler and Loomes (2011) asked subjects to indicate their decision
confidence about their choice between two options in the ordinal terms of surely, probably,
and unsure. Instead of asking subjects to state how confident they were, Cohen et al.
(1987), Cubitt et al. (2015), and Enke and Graeber (2019) obtained confidence intervals
from their subjects. Cohen et al. (1987) and Cubitt et al. (2015) had subjects report
the range of choices over which they were unsure of their preferences, whereas Enke and
Graeber (2019) had subjects report the range of values over which they were certain of
their preferences.
We build on these studies to propose an incentivized quantitative measure to elicit deci-
1For example, insofar as individuals feel less confident about their choices when excessive options are
available, it may be better to limit the number of investment options in retirement plans (Iyengar and
Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2004; Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010)
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sion confidence. Instead of requiring subjects to commit to one option out of two available
options, this measure allows the individual to choose the randomization probabilities ac-
cording to which she receives each option. We show theoretically and experimentally that
the individual may prefer to randomize when she is not 100% confident in choosing one
option over the other and that the randomization probabilities vary according to how
confident she is about this decision.
Theoretically, we capture the lack of confidence about choices by assuming that an indi-
vidual has multiple selves. Each self represents one particular way to trade off between
conflicting objectives, and different trade-offs imply different optimal choices. The more
strongly the multiple selves disagree with each other, the less confident the individual feels
about choosing one option over the other. Furthermore, the individual dislikes disagree-
ment among the multiple selves, because individual decision-making in the presence of
multiple selves is similar to group decision-making, which requires members with different
opinions to reach a consensus. In both situations, stronger disagreement requires more
time and cognitive effort for decision-making. Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that
randomization reveals the individual’s lack of confidence in choosing one option over the
other because randomizing reveals her preference to "hedge" across multiple selves when
they disagree with each other. Moreover, the randomization probability assigned to each
option measures the level of decision confidence about that option, with a smaller random-
ization probability for an option indicating weaker confidence in choosing that option over
the other.
We tested the link between randomization probability and decision confidence in an ex-
periment. The experiment requires subjects to make a choice between pairs of options: a
lottery x and a sure payment y. The choice between a lottery and a sure payment involves
a trade-off between risk and return, as in many investment decisions. For each lottery x,
we kept the lottery the same in each pair and varied the sure payment y with 13 possible
values in a random sequence. Subjects first made a standard binary choice in which they
chose either the lottery x or the sure payment y. To elicit subjects’ decision confidence,
we followed Dubourg et al. (1994) and Butler and Loomes (2007) by allowing subjects to
state how confident they were about each choice (surely, probably, or unsure). After the
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binary choices and confidence statements were made, subjects proceeded to the randomized
choices, in which they chose a randomization probability 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 with which they would
receive x (and with probability 1− λ receive y) for each pair of options, again in random
sequence. The binary choices, confidence statements, and randomization probabilities al-
lowed us to test for the presence of a systematic relationship between the randomization
probabilities and confidence statements. We further checked the robustness of this rela-
tionship by varying across four different lotteries of different cognitive demands and two
experimental conditions in which half of the subjects were provided with the simulated
experience of a lottery and the other half did not.
Our experimental results suggest a systematic relationship between randomization prob-
abilities and confidence statements. We find an economically important and statistically
significant correlation between subjects’ randomization probabilities and confidence state-
ments (median Spearman correlation of 0.85). The randomization probability associated
with an option increases as the stated confidence for that option increases from "Unsure"
to "Probably" to "Surely." The results suggest empirical validity in interpreting random-
ization probability as probabilistic confidence, in the sense that assigning a randomization
probability of 0.5 to an option corresponds to being 50% confident in choosing that option
over the other. Additionally, the confidence intervals – the range of sure payments y for
which subjects do not feel fully confident about their choices – identified from randomiza-
tion probabilities are close to those identified from confidence statements. These findings
are largely robust to lottery types and the provision of experience sampling. Further anal-
ysis also suggests that subjects’ randomization pattern is consistent with our theoretical
analysis, but not with indifference, errors, or nonlinear probability weighting (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Quiggin, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Overall, our results
suggest that randomization probability serves well as an incentivized quantitative measure
of decision confidence about choices.
Our study contributes to the literature on decision confidence in several ways. First,
our measure substantiates and complements the earlier non-incentivised measures. If dif-
ferent measures aiming to capture decision confidence are systematically related, we are
more confident that they indeed capture what we intend to capture. Our measure further
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complements earlier measures because proper material incentives improve data quality
by motivating subjects to devote more time and cognitive effort to making the choices.
Second, our measure is quantitative and continuous, offering flexibility for data analysis.
For example, depending on the needs of the research, we can focus on variant confidence
intervals, such as 90% or 95%. Achieving the same flexibility with confidence intervals
revealed from self-reported statements might be difficult, because such confidence intervals
might not be sensitive to manipulation. Indeed, Enke and Graeber (2019) elicited confi-
dence intervals of 70%, 90%, 95%, 99%, and 100% via confidence statements and found
that subjects are unresponsive to the manipulation and always report similar confidence
intervals. Furthermore, the quantitative randomization probability and its associated lot-
tery outcomes are objective. They can be compared across individuals when needed.2
Self-reported confidence statements are, however, subjective and could have a different
meaning for different individuals.3 For example, some consider a probabilistic confidence
level of 68% sufficient for stating "sure,” whereas others may require 85%. Finally, deci-
sion confidence is traditionally an intuitive idea with many different interpretations, and
our theoretical analysis provides a concrete conceptual definition.4 We show that decision
confidence revealed through randomization probability is the (expected) utility difference
weighted by a measure of disagreement among multiple selves.
Although our paper builds directly on studies of decision confidence (Dubourg et al., 1994,
1997; Butler and Loomes, 2007, 2011; Cubitt et al., 2015), it is also closely related to
studies that have investigated preference uncertainty, convex preferences, and/or conflicts
in choices (Bewley, 2002; Eliaz and Ok, 2006; Ok et al., 2012; Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015;
Qiu and Ong, 2017; Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2019; Agranov and Ortoleva, 2020). In particular,
both Qiu and Ong (2017) and Agranov and Ortoleva (2020) allowed subjects to assign
randomization probabilities to the two options that they face in a decision. Qiu and Ong
2Needless to say, comparing any measures across individuals can be problematic and requires a strong
motivation.
3Indeed, our experimental result presented in Appendix D suggests that different individuals could
associate the same confidence statement with different probabilistic confidence levels.
4For example, decision confidence could be related to the utility difference between options (as the
strength of preferences in Butler et al., 2014). Although the two are clearly related, the utility difference
does not directly translate into decision confidence. The utility difference between two sure payments of
10 euro and 10.01 euro is small, but subjects are likely to be 100% confident about their preferences.
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(2017) discussed how randomization reveals a difficult trade-off between conflicting values
in choices, whereas Agranov and Ortoleva (2020) investigated the ranges of values for
which subjects randomize between two options and related these ranges to certainty bias
and nonmonotonic choices. Our study contributes to this line of research by showing how
randomization may also be related to decision confidence and how eliciting randomization
probabilities may be an alternative measure of decision confidence.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental procedure. Section 3
provides the theoretical basis for how randomization probability may be linked to decision
confidence. The results are reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the study.
2 Experimental design
The experiment consisted of eight treatments of four lotteries (with different cognitive de-
mands) × two conditions (with/out experience sampling). We describe the general struc-
ture of the experiment in all treatments before detailing the conditions of each treatment.
2.1 General structure of the experiment
Subjects faced a pair of options in each decision: option x (a lottery) and option y (a
sure payment). Within each treatment, option x was kept the same, whereas option y
went through a random sequence of 13 possible values, which were lottery dependent.
For each pair of options, subjects needed to make three decisions. First, subjects made
a binary choice in which they chose either x or y. Next, subjects reported their level
of confidence about their binary choice. They could report "Surely x," "Probably x,"
"Unsure," "Probably y" and "Surely y", statements that were also used in, e.g., Dubourg
et al. (1994) and Butler and Loomes (2007). Finally, they made randomized choices in
which they chose a randomization probability λ according to which they receive x (and
hence with chance 1− λ receive y). For example, a value of λ = 0.75 means subjects may
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Figure 1: An example of the decision screen, where option x is a lottery to gain 9 euro
with a chance of 50% and 1 euro with a chance of 50%. Option y is a sure payment and
varies across choices. Subjects had to move the slider to determine the randomization
probability. The randomization probability changed at an increment of 1%. Changes in
the randomization probability were reflected in the descriptions below the slider.
receive x with a chance of 75% and receive y with a chance of 25%.5 The randomization
probability changes at an increment of 1%. Figure 1 shows an example of the decision
screen for a randomized choice.
The three sets of decisions were made in two stages. In each treatment, subjects stated
the binary choice and then provided their confidence statements for each pair of options
in the first stage. When all the binary choices and confidence statements were made, they
went on to the randomization stage, in which they assigned a randomization probability
for each pair of options x and y.
2.2 Treatments
There were two types of treatment variations in our experiment: four lotteries with different
cognitive demands and the condition of allowing for or not allowing for sampling potential
outcomes of the lottery.
5In the experiment, we explain the chance as a computer drawing a random number between 1 and 100.
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We vary cognitive demand for decision-making by changing the number (two or four) and
the payoff (loss or gain) domain of the lottery outcomes. This allows us to examine whether
the association between confidence and randomization, if present, is robust to the different
levels of cognitive demand required for different lotteries. There were four lotteries, and all
subjects went through them in a sequence randomized across subjects. Subjects completed
all the decisions as described in the previous subsection associated with each lottery before
moving on to the next lottery.
The baseline lottery is a simple lottery with two outcomes (gain 9 euro with a chance of 50%,
and gain 1 euro with a chance of 50%). Because some studies have shown that people find
it hard to evaluate lotteries with more outcomes and dislike them (Huck and Weizsäcker,
1999; Sonsino et al., 2002; Moffatt et al., 2015), we introduce a second lottery with four
outcomes, which we refer to as the complex lottery (gain 9.75 euro with a chance of 20%,
gain 7.50 euro with a chance of 30%, gain 2.50 euro with a chance of 30%, and gain 0.25
euro with a chance of 20%).6 The third and fourth lottery are similar to the simple lottery
in the number of outcomes, but they involve potential losses. Establishing the association
between confidence and randomization in lotteries involving losses is important in view of
evidence showing that people behave differently when faced with losses compared to gains
(Gonzalez et al., 2005; Pabst et al., 2013) and that they face emotional trade-off difficulty
with losses (Luce et al., 1999). The third lottery, which we refer to as the loss lottery,
has all its outcomes in the domain of losses: lose 9 euro with a chance of 50% and lose
1 euro with a chance of 50%. This lottery is constructed by subtracting 10 euro from
payoffs of the simple lottery. The fourth lottery – the mixed lottery – involves both payoff
domains (gain 4 euro with a chance of 50%, and lose 4 euro with a chance of 50%). This
lottery is constructed by subtracting 5 euro from the payoffs of the simple lottery. Because
there may be losses in these two lotteries, subjects received an initial endowment for these
two lotteries to prevent them from incurring out-of-pocket losses (an initial endowment
of 10 euro for the loss lottery and of 5 euro for the mixed lottery). To make the initial
endowment salient, a 10-euro bill and 5-euro bill was displayed on the decision screens for
the loss lottery and mixed lottery, respectively. Table 1 summarizes the different lotteries
6The simple and the complex lotteries have the same expected value. The standard deviation of the
simple lottery is 4.0, slightly larger than that of the complex lottery (3.6).
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Lotteries Option x Option y
The simple lottery (50%, 9 ; 50%, 1 )
Receiving y for sure
(y is between 0 and 10 )
The complex lottery
(20%, 9,75 ; 30%, 7,50 ; Receiving y for sure
30%, 2,50 ; 20%, 0,25 ) (y is between 0 and 10 )
The loss lottery (50%, -9 ; 50%, -1 )
Receiving y for sure
(y is between -10 and 0 )
The mixed lottery (50%, 4 ; 50%, -4 )
Receiving y for sure
(y is between -5 and 5 )
Table 1: Summary of options x and y in the four lotteries. In the simple lottery and the
complex lottery, y takes the value of Y ∈ {0, 2, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5.0, 5.5, 6, 6.5, 7, 8, 10}, in the
loss lottery y is each value in Y minus 10, and in the mixed lottery y is each value in Y
minus 5.
and the set of sure payment amounts for y in the experiment.
The second type of treatment we introduce in the experiment examines whether allowing
subjects to experience the potential outcomes of the lotteries improves their confidence
in decision-making. Previous experiments have found that trading experience reduces the
WTA-WTP gap (List, 2003, 2011) and that simulated experience makes subjects feel more
informed about their decisions and encourages them to take more risks (Bradbury et al.,
2014). We adopt the experience sampling approach of Hertwig et al. (2004). Experience
sampling is consistent with a notion in accumulator models that contemplatesthat the util-
ity distribution of the alternative is built on past experiences (Busemeyer and Townsend,
1993).
Half of the subjects were assigned to the experience sampling treatment. After a lottery
was explained to these subjects and before they had to make choices between the lottery
and the sure payment, they viewed a screen on which they had to click a button to generate
the potential outcomes of the lottery. A bar chart on the same page recorded each lottery
outcome that was simulated and illustrated the frequency of each lottery outcome. Subjects
had to click 20 times to complete the experience sampling exercise, at which point they
could proceed to making their choices. At the 20th click, the final bar chart displayed
the distribution of the lottery outcomes the same as the probability distribution of the
lottery.For example, the simulated 20 outcomes of the complex lottery were always 4 times
9.75 euro, 6 times 7.50 euro, 6 times 2.50 euros, and 4 times 0.75 euro. Subjects went
through experience sampling for each lottery and made decisions for that lottery before
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Figure 2: An example of the screen on which subjects are allowed to sample outcomes
of the simple lottery. The final bargraph of the sampled outcomes is displayed on the
subsequent decision screens.
going through experience sampling for the next lottery. To remind the subjects about the
simulated experience of a lottery, the bar chart showing the distribution of outcomes for
that lottery was made available at the side of the decision screens when subjects made
their binary choices and the randomization probabilities between that lottery and the sure
payment.
2.3 Sample and procedure
The experiment was conducted with a sample of 205 subjects of the DISCON lab at
Radboud University. Invitations were sent in batches via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). About
half of the subjects were male and about half were female. The experiment was conducted
using Qualtrics, and lasted approximately 20 minutes. Subjects made binary choices,
confidence statements, and randomization probabilities for 13 pairs of options for each
lottery. Examples from the experimental materials can be found in Appendix D.
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Each student received a participation fee of 1 euro and monetary compensation based on
their binary and randomization decisions in the experiment. Specifically, for each subject,
one decision out of all the binary and randomization decisions was randomly selected for
payment. We made the payment via bank transfers.
3 Theoretical analysis
In this section, we demonstrate the concrete link between decision confidence and the
randomization probability in the randomized choices. Building on Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2015) and Klibanoff et al. (2005), we propose an approach to capturing the decision-
making of an individual who might have limited confidence for some choices. We then
show the link between randomization probability and decision confidence. We discuss
alternative interpretations of randomization, such as indifference, errors, and nonlinear
probability weighting, in subsection 4.2.
3.1 Decision-making with limited confidence
Standard economics assumes that a unique utility function (subject to positive affine trans-
formation) captures the individual’s preference. The individual always makes choices with
full confidence. It can be shown that under standard economic models, the individual
chooses λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) at most once in the 13 choice pairs in most treatments.7
When the individual might feel unsure about her choices, the assumption of a unique utility
function is no longer appropriate. To accommodate the possibility that a decision-maker
might not be fully confident about her choices, we assume the individual has multiple
utility functions that we call multiple selves, with each self representing one particular
way to trade off between conflicting objectives in choices. Such a modelling technique is
popular in models of incomplete preferences (see e.g., Bewley, 2002; Dubra et al., 2004;
7Such models include the expected utility theory, cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1982). Appendix B
discusses this claim in more detail.
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Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015). The individual is fully confident about her choices when all
selves choose in the same way. The individual is not fully confident about her choices when
some selves choose one option but others choose other options.
Specifically, let uτ denote the utility function of the self τ and Γ denote the set of selves.
Let π denote the probability distribution over Γ . Given a utility function uτ , we follow
the standard assumption that the self behaves according to the expected utility theory
(EUT). Let EUτ (l) denote the expected utility of an option l ∈ L. We further assume
that the individual dislikes disagreement among selves, because arriving at a choice in the
presence of multiple selves with different preferences is, in essence, similar to situations
in which a group of people with different opinions tries to reach a consensus. The more
strongly members disagree with each other, the more difficult it is for the group to make
compromises and agree on a single opinion. Aversion to disagreement among selves can
then be interpreted as the cost of forcing different selves to make compromises and agree
on a single choice. With the above assumptions, we can write the individual’s preference




φ [EU τ (l)] dπ, (1)
, where concave φ(·) implies an aversion to disagreement – deviations from the mean
expected utility – among different selves. Similar to the connection between the concavity
of utility function and risk aversion, the concavity of φ(·) implies that the individual places
more weight on the selves who give a lower value to l.Such a cautious attitude is consistent
with Levitt (2020), who showed that subjects who experience difficulty in making a decision
are often excessively cautious with respect to maintaining the status quo.
Equation 1 extends directly from Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) and Klibanoff et al. (2005).
It can be seen as a smooth version of the cautious expected utility model (Cerreia-Vioglio
et al., 2015). It is also a parallel of the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005),
in which the state space is the set of multiple selves. Indeed, in ambiguity models of
multiple priors, an individual is unsure about the probability distribution of the states of
nature and has multiple priors. In the current approach, an individual is unsure about her
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utility function and has multiple selves.
3.2 Linking the randomization probability to decision confidence
We are now ready to establish the link between decision confidence and the randomization
probability in the randomized choices. In particular, we will show that a smaller ran-
domization probability for an option is associated with lower confidence in choosing that
option.
Specifically, recall that in our mechanism the individual chooses a randomization prob-
ability λ ∈ [0, 1] and builds a lottery (λ, x; (1 − λ), y): she receives x with probability
λ and y with probability 1 − λ. Because for any given self τ the individual’s pref-
erence over the lottery (λ, x; (1 − λ), y) satisfies EUT, we have EUt [λx+ (1− λ)y] =
λEUt(x) + (1 − λ)EUt(y).
8 The individual’s decision is then to maximize her utility by
choosing the optimal randomization probability 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1:9
Maxλ V [λx+ (1− λ)y] =
∫
Γ
φ [λEUτ (x) + (1− λ)EUτ (y)] dπ.
In the experiment, y is a sure payment. Sure monetary payments are probably the easiest
options to evaluate, and we thus assume the individual is always confident about her
evaluation of a sure payment: EUτ (y) = u(y), ∀τ ∈ Γ when y is a sure payment. In this










, where ∆u = Et [EUt(x)] − u(y) captures the expected utility difference of x and y,
σ2x = Et [EUt(x)− Et(EUt(x))]
2 is the standard deviation of EUt(x) and approximates
8When x is a lottery, (λ, x; (1− λ), y) is a compound lottery. We follow EUT and assume reduction of
compound lotteries for these choices.
9Taking Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) literally, the negative certainty independence axiom implies no
preference for randomization when a lottery is matched with a sure payment.













. The detailed derivation
is presented in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: The optimal λ∗ depending on the value of y. The figure is produced by assuming
φ(EUt) = 1 − e
−EUt , Prob(u1) = 0.5, Prob(u2) = 0.5, EU1(x) = 1,EU2(x) = 0, and
EU1(y) = EU2(y) = y. The optimal randomization probability λ
∗ = −ln( y1−y ).
how strongly different selves disagree with each other. Similarly to decision-making under
risk, −φ
′′(u(y))
φ′(u(y)) can be interpreted as a metric of attitudes toward disagreement among
selves.
To see the link between the randomization probability λ and decision confidence, note that
intuitively the individual should be less confident about choosing x when x becomes less
attractive relative to y and should be more uncertain about her evaluation of x. Equation
2 reflects this intuition exactly: Weaker confidence in choosing x is associated with smaller
randomization probability for x (λ is small when ∆u is small and σ
2
x is large). It is in this
sense that we state λ∗ reveals and measures confidence in choices.
As a concrete illustration, consider the following numerical example: The individual has
two selves t = 1, 2, and considers them equally likely. Option x is a lottery, and EU1(x) = 1
and EU2(x) = 0. Option y is a sure payment, and u1(y) = u2(y) = y. The function
φ(EUt) = 1−e
−EUt , where the concavity of φ(·) captures her attitude toward the disagree-
ment among multiple selves. The decision utility of choosing option y is V (y) = 1 − e−y,
and the decision utility of choosing option x is V (x) = 0.5(1 − e−1) + 0.5 × 0 = 0.316.
When y is sufficiently similar to x (0.27 < y < 12), the individual will have incentive to
14









. A simple calculation shows that
the optimal λ∗ = −ln( y1−y ), subject to 0 ≤ λ
∗ ≤ 1. Figure 3 shows the relationship be-
tween the optimal λ∗ and y. As one can see, when y becomes more attractive, the value of
λ∗ decreases. Moreover, λ∗ approaches 0.5 when the two options become similar in terms
of their decision utilities (V (y) = 0.314 versus V (x) = 0.316).
4 Experimental results
We report our experimental results in two steps. First, we link randomization probabili-
ties directly to self-reported confidence statements and show that there exists a systematic
relationship between the two. Second, we discuss alternative interpretations of random-
ization and show why randomization is unlikely to reflect indifference, errors, or nonlinear
probability weighting.
4.1 Randomization probabilities and confidence statements
We provide four empirical observations that are consistent with a systematic relationship
between randomization probabilities and confidence statements. First, we show that there
is an economically important and statistically significant correlation between randomiza-
tion probabilities and confidence statements. Second, we demonstrate that it is empirically
valid to interpret randomization probability directly as probabilistic confidence. Third,
around the sure payments where subjects switched between the lottery and the sure pay-
ments (switching choices),we find that subjects tended to report the least confidence about
their choice and choose randomization probabilities around 0.5. Finally, we compare the
confidence intervals defined by randomization probabilities and confidence statements and
show that they are closely related to each other. Because these results are robust to the four
lotteries and the experience sampling condition, most of the results discussed henceforth
are based on the aggregated data from all lotteries and experimental conditions. Where
relevant, we briefly discuss the presence of treatment differences. The detailed results for
15
Simple Complex Loss Mixed
No experience sampling
10th percentile 0.60 0.69 0.67 0.35
median 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.85
90th percentile 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96
Experience sampling
10th percentile 0.60 0.63 0.65 0.47
median 0.93 0.88 0.87 0.81
90th percentile 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.95
Table 2: Nonparametric Spearman correlation at the 10th percentile, median, and 90th
percentile by lottery and experience sampling conditions
each lottery and the experience sampling conditions that are not presented in this section
are provided in the Appendix.
Our first result summarizes the correlation between randomization probabilities and con-
fidence statements.
Result 1. Across all lotteries and experience sampling conditions, there exists an econom-
ically important and statistically significant correlation between randomization probabilities
and confidence statements.
Support: To compute the correlation between the randomization probabilities and the
confidence statements, we assigned values to the confidence statements of "Surely x,"
"Probably x," "Unsure," "Probably y," and "Surely y” on a scale of 5 to 1, with "Surely
x"’ taking the value of 5 and "Surely y" taking the value of 1. For each subject, we com-
puted the nonparametric Spearman correlation for each lottery. A positive correlation is
consistent with our hypothesis that the more confident the subject is about choosing the
lottery over the sure payment, the higher the randomization probability she assigns to x.
The pooled median Spearman correlation across lotteries and subjects is 0.85 (p < 0.01),
with a correlation of 0.93 at the 90th percentile and a correlation of 0.67 at the 10th
percentile.11 Table 2 reports the 10th percentile, medians, and 90th percentile of the cor-
relations for the four lotteries in the two experimental conditions. Across lotteries and
conditions, median correlations range from 0.81 to 0.93. When we examine the correlation
at the 10th percentile, correlation is above 0.60 for most lotteries.12 Overall, the high
11Three subjects did not vary their confidence statements, and thus no correlation can be estimated.



























































































































Figure 4: Histograms of randomization probability of each confidence statement across
lotteries and conditions. The x-axis is the randomization probability (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1).
correlation found between confidence statements and randomization probabilities is con-
sistent with a systematic relationship between randomization probabilities and confidence
statements.
Our second result demonstrates how randomization probabilities vary with confidence
statements.
Result 2. Randomization probabilities relate systematically to confidence statements, with
a high randomization probability for an option corresponding to high confidence in choosing
that option. Furthermore, it is empirically valid to interpret randomization probability for
an option directly as the probabilistic confidence of choosing that option.
Support: We look at the mean randomization probability that corresponds to each confi-
dence statement. On aggregate, consistent with our hypothesis, the randomization proba-
bility for x decreases with the confidence about choosing x: The randomization probability
is 0.89 for "Surely x," 0.70 for "Probably x," 0.54 for "Unsure," 0.33 for "Probably y,"
and 0.11 for "Surely y." Figure 4 shows the histograms of the randomization probabilities
across the five confidence statements. The randomization probabilities show a clear shift
from the right to the left as we move from "Surely x" to "Surely y."
dence statements and randomization probabilities.
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Figure 4 shows that the majority of the decisions (64%) for which subjects chose "Surely x"
were given the randomization probability of 1 for x and that the majority of the decisions
(63%) for which subjects chose "Surely y" were given the randomization probability of
0 for x. The reverse is also true. Among the decisions in which subjects assigned a
randomization probability of 1 for x, 78% had "Surely x" as the corresponding confidence
statement. 83% of the decisions in which subjects assigned a randomization probability of 0
for x were rated "Surely y." These results show a strong association between randomization
probability and confidence statements at the extreme ends.
Compared to "Surely x," the distribution of the randomization probability correspond-
ing to the confidence statement "Probably x" is also skewed to the left. However, the
randomization probability for "Probably x" does not have a clear peak, as "Surely x"
does.Likewise, the randomization probability distribution corresponding to the confidence
statement "Probably x" is skewed to the right but without a clear peak. The results suggest
that subjects may have less consensus over the randomization probabilities associated with
"Probably x" and "Probably y" than over those associated with "Surely x" and "Surely
y," even though there is general agreement that the randomization probabilities associ-
ated with "Probably x" are smaller than those of "Surely x" and that the randomization
probabilities associated with "Probably y" are larger than those of "Surely y."
Finally, the randomization probability distribution corresponding to "Unsure" is a bell-
shaped distribution, with a clear peak between 0.4 to 0.5. The results suggest that the
consensus over the randomization probability associated with "Unsure" is weaker than
the consensus over that associated with "Surely x" and "Surely y" but stronger than the
consensus over that associated with "Probably x" and "Probably y". The positive rela-
tionship between the randomization probability for x and the confidence in choosing x is
observed for all lotteries and experience sampling conditions. Table 3 reports the mean
and standard deviation of the randomization probability for each confidence statement in
aggregate and for each lottery and experience sampling condition. The mean randomiza-
tion probability for each confidence statement does not differ significantly across lotteries.
Experience sampling also does not appear to have any effect on the relationship between
the randomization probability and the confidence statements.
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Conditions Lotteries Surely x Probably x Unsure Probably y Surely y
Aggregate
0.89 0.70 0.54 0.33 0.11
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20)
No
Simple
0.92 0.72 0.50 0.35 0.10
(0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22) (0.18)
Complex
0.90 0.72 0.56 0.34 0.11
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20)
sampling
Loss
0.92 0.72 0.52 0.31 0.08
(0.17) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.18)
Mixed
0.88 0.71 0.53 0.35 0.12
(0.26) (0.22) (0.23) (0.27) (0.24)
Sampling
Simple
0.87 0.68 0.55 0.31 0.10
(0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Complex
0.86 0.67 0.51 0.32 0.12
(0.23) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Loss
0.89 0.70 0.57 0.33 0.08
(0.19) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.16)
Mixed
0.88 0.71 0.55 0.34 0.12
(0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25)
Table 3: Mean randomization probability at each confidence level for the four lotteries
in the two experience sampling conditions. The values in parentheses are the standard
deviations of randomization probabilities.
In addition, we found that the association between the randomization probabilities and
the confidence statements is broadly consistent with the way probabilistic confidence levels
were implemented empirically in other studies. For example, Vanberg (2008) used the
probabilistic confidence of 0.85 as the cutoff level between sure and probably, 0.68 as the
cutoff level between probably and unsure, and 0.50 as unsure (Vanberg, 2008, Footnote 10).
These values correspond to the mean randomization probabilities reported above for each
confidence statement. For example, the mean randomization probability on aggregate
is 0.89 for "Surely x," 0.70 for "Probably x," and 0.54 for "Unsure." Because we did
not intentionally prime subjects to relate the randomization probability of choosing x
to the probabilistic confidence of choosing x, the similarities in the empirical findings
of the two measures in two separate studies suggest that a common cognitive pathway
may have been responsible for both types of decision, linking randomization probability
to confidence. In particular, it is empirically valid to interpret randomization probability
directly as probabilistic confidence (e.g., a randomization probability 0.8 of choosing an
option corresponds to being 80% confident about choosing that option).
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We proceed to check the connection between subjects’ behaviour around the switching
choices in the binary choices and their corresponding randomization probabilities. Recall
that subjects faced 13 binary choices. Subjects may prefer the lottery x over y in some
choices and prefer y over x in others. If subjects are confident about their choices, they may
switch from preferring x to preferring y at one value of y (one switching point). However,
when subjects are not fully confident about their choices, they may switch between x to
y multiple times (multiple switching points). Among the 205 subjects who participated in
the experiment, 140 switched multiple times for at least one of the four lotteries.13
Due to the prevalence of multiple switching points, we study the switching decisions of
each subject at two levels of sure payments: y is the highest sure payment amount at and
below which subjects consistently preferred x over y; ȳ is the lowest sure payment amount
at and above which subjects consistently chose y over x. We henceforth refer values of y
between y and ȳ as the switching range. Because utility of x and utility of y are the closest
within the switching range, we postulate that subjects were less likely to be fully confident
about their choices when y was between y and ȳ and were hence more likely to randomize
between x and y facing these values compared to other values of y. Result 3 summarizes
this result.
Result 3. Subjects were less confident about their choices within the switching range, and
they chose a randomization probability around 0.5 when they were least confident.
Support: Across lotteries and experience sampling conditions, the median confidence state-
ments were "Probably x" at y and "Probably y" at ȳ, with "Unsure" selected for 20% of
values of y within the switching range. 73% of all confidence statements within the switch-
ing range were "Probably x," "Unsure," or "Probably y," compared to 45% of confidence
statements outside the switching range. These confidence reports support our hypothesis
that subjects were less confident about their choices within the switching range.
Examining the randomization probabilities at y and ȳ, we find that across treatments
subjects assigned a median randomization probability of 0.62 to x (0.38 to y) at y, and a
13Specifically, there were 36 subjects who switched multiple times for the simple lottery, 50 for the
complex lottery, 56 for the loss lottery, and 98 for the mixed lottery. In the no sampling condition and
sampling condition, 71 and 69 subjects switched multiple times, respectively.
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median randomization probability of 0.39 to x (0.61 to y) at ȳ. In other words, subjects
were more likely to choose a randomization probability which lies between 0.39 to 0.62 for
x for a choice they were less confident about. The median randomization probability for
all the choices that fall within the switching range, y to ȳ, is 0.5.
This result is consistent with the example in Section 2.2, in which individuals choose
λ∗ = 0.5 when the decision utilities from x and y were close. This result holds for all
lotteries and experimental conditions. Table 5 in the Appendix reports subjects’ confidence
statements and randomization probabilities corresponding to the switching ranges for the
four lotteries and the experience sampling conditions.
Consistent with the above result, Figure 5 shows that higher proportions of subjects ran-
domize and choose "Probably x," "Unsure," and "Probably y" around the switching choices
than for y values further away from the switching range. In addition, the proportion of
subjects choosing a randomization probability between 0.15 and 0.85 closely matches the
proportion of subjects choosing "Probably x," "Unsure," or "Probably y" (see Table 6 in
the Appendix for the exact proportion at each value of y). This result provides further
support for Result 2 to interpret randomization probability as the probabilistic confidence
of choices.
There is growing interest in finding ways to elicit confidence intervals, that is, the range
of values between which subjects do not feel fully confident about their choices (Cohen
et al., 1987; Butler and Loomes, 2011; Cubitt et al., 2015; Enke and Graeber, 2019). These
studies have relied mostly on self-reported confidence statements to determine these con-
fidence intervals. We show that randomization probabilities offer an alternative approach
to determining the confidence intervals. Result 4 summarizes the findings.
Result 4. On average, the confidence intervals defined by confidence statements are closely
related to the confidence intervals defined by randomization probabilities of 0.15 < λ < 0.85.
Support: There are two ways to define the confidence intervals: using the self-reported
confidence statements and defining them as the interval for which subjects do not consis-
tently state "Surely x or y", or using the randomization probability and defining it as the
21
Figure 5: Proportion of subjects’ decisions corresponding to different levels of randomiza-
tion and confidence statements at the values of y.
interval for which subjects give randomization probabilities not consistently outside the
given threshold (0 < λ < 1 or 0.15 < λ < 0.85). Before we report the results, recall that
the y values of the loss lottery and mixed lottery are simply those of the simple lottery and
complex lottery subtracted by 10 euro and 5 euro, respectively. To make the confidence
intervals across lotteries comparable, we add 10 and 5 to the confidence intervals of the
loss lottery and the mixed lottery, respectively. Taking 0 < λ < 1 to define the confidence
interval based on randomization probabilities, we find a larger interval than the confidence
interval defined by the confidence statements. On aggregate, the confidence interval de-
fined by randomization probabilities (0 < λ < 1) ranges from 2.0 to 7.0. By contrast, the
confidence interval corresponding to the confidence statements "Probably x," "Unsure,"
and "Probably y" ranges from 3.0 to 6.5. This is not surprising, because as we reported
above, the confidence statements of "Probably x" and "Probably y" correspond to less
extreme randomization probabilities (See result 2). Once we restrict the randomization
probabilities to the same values defining the confidence thresholds in Vanberg (2008), that
is, 0.15 < λ < 0.85, we obtain a confidence interval that ranges from 3.0 to 6.5, similar
to the confidence interval defined by the confidence statements. Looking at the confi-
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dence intervals for each subject, we see that the median interval defined by the confidence
statements is 4.5. For the confidence intervals defined by the randomization probabilities
(0 < λ < 1 and 0.15 < λ < 0.85), we find a median confidence interval of 6 and 4.5, re-
spectively. A two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum test of the confidence intervals derived
from confidence statements and randomization probabilities shows a significant difference
between the confidence statements and randomization probabilities with 0 < λ < 1. Even
though the median ranges are the same, we find an economically weak (mean values of 4.73
for confidence statements and 4.27 for randomization probabilities) but statistically signif-
icant difference between the confidence intervals derived from the confidence statements
and the randomization probabilities with 0.15 < λ < 0.85 (p < 0.01). This is probably
due to the high power from the large sample and the paired test. The similarity between
the two confidence intervals derived from confidence statements and randomization prob-
abilities with 0.15 < λ < 0.85 is robust to the type of lotteries and experience sampling
conditions. Table 7 in the Appendix reports the confidence intervals defined by random-
ization probabilities and confidence statements for the four lotteries and the experience
sampling conditions separately.
4.2 Alternative interpretations of randomization
We have interpreted randomization as a lack of decision confidence in the face of preference
uncertainty. Our theoretical analysis provides an explicit link between the randomization
probability and decision confidence. Our experimental results show a systematic relation-
ship between randomization probabilities and confidence statements. However, subjects
might randomize for reasons other than decision confidence, and the above relationship
could be merely a coincidence. In this subsection, we consider interpretations of random-
ization other than decision confidence. Overall, these alternative interpretations suggest
either randomization at most once or no systematic relationship between randomization
probabilities and confidence statements.
The first alternative interpretation of randomization is indifference. In expected utility
theory, individuals can choose any randomization probability when they consider two op-
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Randomization The number of subjects who chose randomization
Interval 0 times 1 time 2 times or more 3 times or more
0 < λ < 1 2 1 202 196
0.15 < λ < 0.85 3 1 201 196
0.32 < λ < 0.68 9 3 193 188
Table 4: The distribution of subjects who chose 0 < λ < 1, 0.15 < λ < 0.85, and
0.32 < λ < 0.68 zero times, one time, two times or more, and three times or more across
the four lotteries and two experimental conditions. The results for the two conditions and
four lotteries separately are in Table 8 in the Appendix.
tions indifferent, and indifference arises only in one pair of x and y. Our next result shows
that most of our subjects randomize more than once.
Result 5. Inconsistent with expected utility theory, the majority of subjects randomized
over x and y at least over two values of y.
Support: Table 4 shows that the majority (over 99% on aggregate) of subjects assigned a
randomization probability strictly within 0 and 1.0 to y two times or more in at least one
lottery or experimental condition. Table 8 in the Appendix reports the results for the two
conditions and four lotteries separately. As we can see, the vast majority (more than 86%)
of subjects assigned a randomization probability strictly within 0 and 1 to y two times or
more in all lotteries and conditions. This is inconsistent with the prediction of standard
economic models, according to which subjects randomize at most once.
The second possibility is that those randomization choices were random errors. If so, there
should be no relationship between randomization probabilities and confidence statements,
which is inconsistent with our results in the previous section. Furthermore, Result 6 below
shows that despite the random sequence in which the different values of y were presented,
the randomization probabilities of choosing x decreased monotonically with the value of y.
In addition, there is evidence that randomization probabilities and confidence statements
responded to experimental treatments.
Result 6. Consistent with our theoretical analysis, the randomization probability of choos-
ing x decreased with the value of y; and there is evidence that the confidence intervals in















































Figure 6: Median randomization probabilities that subjects assign to x, as a function
of the value of y, for the four lotteries across the two conditions. For the simple and
complex lottery, y takes the value of Y ∈ {0, 2, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5.0, 5.5, 6, 6.5, 7, 8, 10}, for the
loss lottery y is each value in Y minus 10, and for the mixed lottery y is each value in Y
minus 5. The figure for each condition separately can be found in the Appendix.
Support: Figure 6 reports the median randomization probability of choosing x in rela-
tion to y in the four lottery treatments. As we can see, despite the random sequence in
the randomized choices, subjects’ λ∗ decreased monotonically with the value of y in all
treatments. This result is consistent with Equation 2 and Figure 3.
To investigate the treatment differences across the experience sampling conditions and
lotteries, we compare the confidence intervals obtained from the self-reported confidence
statements and randomization probabilities (0 < λ < 1 or 0.15 < λ < 0.85) across treat-
ments. We hypothesized that subjects experience less decision confidence for the complex
lottery, the loss lottery, and the mixed lottery compared to the simple lottery. Using the
confidence intervals defined by confidence statements, we find some evidence that the con-
fidence intervals of the complex lottery, the loss lottery, and the mixed lottery were wider
than those of the simple lottery (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests, p = 0.06 for
the comparison of the complex versus the simple lottery, p < 0.01 for the comparison of the
loss lottery and the mixed lottery versus the simple lottery). Using the confidence intervals
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defined by randomization probabilities, we find that confidence intervals of the complex
lottery are wider than those of the simple lottery for both 0 < λ < 1 and 0.15 < λ < 0.85
(one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum test, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively). However,
we find no significant differences for the loss lottery and the mixed lottery compared to
the simple lottery (one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum test, p > 0.10). In light of the
numerical simulations in Appendix B, we think risk attitude in the loss domain may distort
confidence-driven randomization. We further hypothesized that subjects who were allowed
to gain experience with the lottery outcomes perceive more decision confidence than those
who did not get to sample outcomes. However, we do not find any significant differences
between the sampling and no sampling conditions for any of the confidence intervals (one-
sided Wilcoxon rank sum test, p > 0.10 for all tests). In Table 9 in the Appendix, the
comparisons for all treatments and conditions are summarized.
The third interpretation of deliberate randomization can be found in nonexpected utility
theories, in particular nonlinear probability weighting. Allowing for sufficient flexibility,
subjects could randomize multiple times when they face a sequence of randomization de-
cisions between x and y. To examine whether nonlinear probability could account for the
randomization pattern in our experiment, we use the most popular parametric forms in
the literature. If nonlinear probability weighting is responsible for randomization, as pos-
itive theories that aim to capture individuals’ actual choices, those forms should be able
to account for the randomization pattern of a large proportion of subjects. However, our
numerical calculation in the Appendix B suggests that probability weighting is unlikely to
be the driving factor for subjects’ randomization. In fact, individuals behaving according
to the popular parametric probability weighting functions should not randomize in the
simple lottery and in the complex lottery. They may randomize when losses are involved,
due to the convex value function in the loss domain. In that case, they are more likely to
randomize in the loss lottery than in the mixed lottery. These predictions are inconsistent
with our experimental results.
Result 7. Nonlinear probability weighting is unlikely the main reason for randomization.
Support: see the numerical calculations in the Appendix B.
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5 Conclusion
We have shown in this study that letting individuals assign randomization probabilities
according to which they receive each option is an incentive-compatible way to elicit decision
confidence. We show the link between randomization probability and decision confidence
theoretically in a framework extended from Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) and Klibanoff
et al. (2005) and demonstrate this relationship empirically through an experiment.
Our experimental results provide strong evidence that one could interpret the randomiza-
tion probability for an option as the probabilistic confidence of choosing that option. We
find that the majority of subjects randomize frequently, and the randomization pattern
is consistent with our theoretical analysis. We further find that randomization probabili-
ties are highly correlated and vary systematically with self-reported qualitative confidence
statements in our experiment, with high randomization probabilities for options associated
with statements indicating higher confidence. Our further examination of alternative in-
terpretations of randomization suggests that indifference, errors, and nonlinear probability
weighting are unlikely to be driving factors. Overall, our results suggest that decision
confidence can be meaningfully and accurately inferred from randomization probability.
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Appendices
A Derivation of the optimal λ∗
Taking first order derivative of the optimisation equation gives:14





φ′ [λEUt(x) + (1− λ)u(y)]× [EUt(x)− u(y)] dπ(t) = 0.
In some cases, preferences of x over y can be straightforward, e.g., when options can be
ordered by some dominance rules. For example, when options x and y are risky lotteries and
option x first degree stochastically dominates option y, it seems natural that individuals
have EUt(x) > u(y), for ∀t ∈ T . Since φ
′ [λEUt(x) + (1− λ)u(y)] > 0, this leads to a
positive first order condition and, hence, λ = 1. Unfortunately, two options cannot in
general be ordered via simple dominance rules. In such situations the choice of λ would
give insights on decision confidence between x and y.
Note that EUt(x) is a random variable governed by the probability distribution π. Let
X = EUt(x), and ∆t = X − u(y). With these notations, we have
φ′ [λEUt(x) + (1− λ)u(y)] = φ
′ [u(y) + λ∆t] .
We are mostly interested in the scenario where the individual finds choices between x and
y difficult, i.e., when the two options are close. Specifically, we are interested in those
situations where ∆t is small relative to X and u(y). When this is the case, we can use the
14The second-order derivative is






′′ [λEUt(x) + (1− λ)u(y)]× [EUt(x)− u(y)]
2
dπ(t).
Since φ(·) is concave, φ′′(·) is negative. We are interested in situations where options x and y are
not the same, i.e., EUt(x) 6= u(y) for some t ∈ T . Together we have φ
′′ [λEUt(x) + (1− λ)u(y)] ×
[EUt(x)− u(y)]
2






′′ [λEUt(x) + (1− λ)u(y)] × [EUt(x)− u(y)]
2
dπ(t) < 0. This ensures we are indeed seeking for the
maximum.
32
Taylor expansion and obtain
φ′ [u(y) + λ∆t] = φ
′(u(y)) + φ′′(u(y))λ∆t +O (λ∆t) ≈ φ
′(u(y)) + φ′′(u(y))λ∆t,
where O (λ∆t) is the sum of the terms that have λ∆t with a power of two or higher. The








































































2 is the standard deviation of EUt(x).
B Predictions under CPT and RDU.
Predicted randomization pattern under CPT and RDU: under popular para-
metric forms and parameters, subjects do not randomize in the simple lottery
and the complex lottery. They may randomize when losses are involved, due
to the convex value function in the loss domain, and they are more likely to
randomize in the loss lottery than in the mixed lottery.
Support: When x is a lottery and y is a sure payment, randomization over x and y creates
a compound lottery. Let v(·) denote the value function, V (·) denote the prospect value of
a lottery, w(·) denote the probability weighting function. If we assume compound inde-
pendence (Segal, 1990), an axiom weaker than reduction of compound lotteries, it can be
easily shown that individuals have no strict incentive to randomize. To see this, note that
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under compound independence subjects evaluate the compound lottery by first evaluating
the simple lottery x and obtain the prospect value V (x). Then, subjects evaluate the
simple lottery (λ, V (x); 1− λ, y) as:
V (λ, V (x); 1− λ, y) = w(λ)V (x) + [1− w(λ)]V (y) = V (y) + w(λ) [V (x)− V (y)] ,
where V (x) (V (y)) is the prospect value of x (y, respectively).
If we assume reduction of compound lotteries, in principle it is possible for individuals to
have a preference to randomize. For example, when the probability weighting function is
concave. To examine whether non-linear probability could account for the randomization
pattern in our experiment, we use the most popular parametric forms in the literature
and adopt the median estimated parameters to calculate the optimal randomization prob-
ability between the lottery and the sure payment. If non-linear probability weighting is
responsible for randomization, median estimations which intend to capture average group
behavior should account for the randomization pattern of a large proportion of subjects.
Our numerical calculations below show that, with most empirical parameters of the proba-
bility weighting function, subjects do not randomize in the simple lottery and the complex
lottery. They may randomize when losses are involved, due to the convex value function in
the loss domain, and they are more likely to randomize in the loss lottery than in the mixed
lottery. However, these predictions are clearly inconsistent with our experimental results.
Table 8 suggests that subjects did not randomize more frequently in the loss lottery and
mixed lottery than in the simple lottery and the complex lottery. Furthermore, Figure 8
suggests that the randomization probabilities that subjects chosen were comparable across
lotteries.







x0.88, x > 0
−2(−x)0.88, x < 0
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Figure 7: Calculations of optimal randomization probabilities. In the calculation we as-
sume the value function: v(x) = x0.88, x ≥ 0, and = −2(−x)0.88, x < 0. The probability
weighting function: w(p)+ = w(p)− = 0.88p
0.65
[0.88p0.65+(1−p)0.65]1/0.65
. We tried a number of forms
and different parameter values. The results are qualitatively the same under all popular
specifications.









We tried a number of forms and different parameter values. The results are qualitatively
the same under all popular specifications. Figure 7 summarizes our calculations.
Consider first the simple lottery x = (10, 0.5; 0, 0.5). When a subject assign random-
ization probability λ to x (and 1 − λ to y), the reduced compound lottery is: L =
35
(0.5λ, 10; 1− λ, y; 0.5λ, 0). The decision utility of the lottery is:
V (L) = w(0.5λ)v(10) + [w(1− 0.5λ)− w(0.5λ)] v(y) + [1− w(1− 0.5λ)] v(0)
= w(0.5λ)v(10) + [w(1− 0.5λ)− w(0.5λ)] v(y),
where the last equation obtains by making the standard assumption of v(0) = 0. For the
complex lottery the compound lottery is L = (0.2λ, 10; 0.3λ, 7.50; 1− λ, y; 0.3λ, 2.5; 0.2λ, 0.25)
when 2.5 < y < 7.5, and the decision utility is:
V (L) = w(0.2λ)v(10) + [w(0.5λ)− w(0.2λ)] v(7.5) + [w(1− 0.5λ)− w(0.5λ)] v(y)
+ [w(1− 0.2λ)− w(1− 0.5λ)] v(2.5) + [1− w(1− 0.2λ)] v(0.25).
For the loss lottery the reduced compound lottery is L = (0.5λ,−10; 1− λ, y; 0.5λ, 0). The
decision utility of the lottery is:
V (L) = w(0.5λ)v(−10) + [w(1− 0.5λ)− w(0.5λ)] v(y).
For the mixed lottery the reduced compound lottery is L = (0.5λ, 5; 1− λ, y; 0.5λ,−5), the
decision utility of the lottery is:
V (L) = w(0.5λ)v(−5) + w(0.5λ)v(5) + [w(1− 0.5λ)− w(0.5λ)] v(y).
36
C Tables and figures
Condition Treatment
Behavior around the switching choice
Randomization probability Confidence statements
y ȳ y ȳ
Aggregate 0.62 0.39 Probably x Probably y
No sampling
Simple 0.67 0.46 Probably x Probably y
Complex 0.63 0.43 Probably x Probably y
Loss 0.55 0.38 Probably x Probably y
Mixed 0.67 0.37 Probably x Probably y
Sampling
Simple 0.60 0.40 Probably x Probably y
Complex 0.60 0.35 Probably x Probably y
Loss 0.58 0.40 Probably x Probably y
Mixed 0.69 0.30 Probably x Probably y
Table 5: Behavior around the switching choice. The value y is the sure payment at and
below which subjects consistently choose x and switch to y for the first time when y is
just above y; and the value ȳ is the sure payment at and above which subjects consistently
choose y and choose x for the last time when y is just below ȳ. The reported valued values
are medians across subjects.
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Value y
Randomization intervals Confidence statements
(1>λ>0) (0.85>λ>0.15) (0.68>λ>0.32) Probably or unsure Unsure
0 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01
2 0.51 0.21 0.06 0.31 0.02
3 0.74 0.50 0.15 0.59 0.07
3.50 0.80 0.63 0.26 0.73 0.11
4 0.84 0.75 0.44 0.78 0.17
4.50 0.84 0.77 0.53 0.82 0.24
5 0.83 0.78 0.59 0.78 0.31
5.50 0.84 0.77 0.55 0.78 0.20
6 0.78 0.68 0.41 0.68 0.11
6.50 0.73 0.61 0.28 0.61 0.08
7 0.65 0.45 0.13 0.41 0.04
8 0.45 0.16 0.04 0.16 0.01
10 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
Table 6: Proportion of decisions made that correspond to the different levels of randomiza-
tion and confidence statements for each value of y. The values of y of the loss and mixed





value (0 < λ < 1.0) (0.15 < λ < 0.85)
No
Simple 4.5 [2.0, 7.0] [3.5, 6.5] [3.0, 6.5]
Complex 4.8 [2.0, 7.0] [3.0, 6.5] [3.0, 6.5]
sampling
Loss +10 5.2 [3.0, 7.0] [3.5, 7.0] [3.0, 7.0]
Mixed +5 5.0 [3.0, 7.0] [3.0, 7.0] [3.0, 7.0]
Sampling
Simple 4.6 [2.0, 7.0] [3.0, 6.5] [3.0, 6.5]
Complex 4.8 [2.0, 7.0] [3.0, 6.5] [3.0, 6.5]
Loss +10 5.5 [3.0, 8.0] [3.5, 7.0] [3.5, 7.0]
Mixed +5 5.2 [3.0, 8.0] [3.0, 7.0] [3.0, 7.0]
Table 7: Mean value in the switching range and confidence intervals across treatments.
The value in the switching range is the mean of the ys in the switching range. The
confidence intervals are the median values of y and ȳ in which subjects choose 0 < λ < 1,
0.15 < λ < 0.85, and in which subjects reports “Probably x”, “unsure”, and “Probably
y”. The values of y for the loss and mixed lottery have been adjusted by +10 and +5
respectively to reflect the same range as the simple and complex lottery.
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Condition Treatments
The number of subjects who chose
λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) for
0 time 1 time 2 times or more 3 times or more
No
Simple 2 6 97 95
Complex 4 1 100 95
sampling
Loss 3 3 99 95
Mixed 6 6 93 89
Sampling
Simple 6 1 93 89
Complex 3 5 92 89
Loss 6 4 90 89
Mixed 9 5 86 83
Table 8: The distribution of subjects who chose 0 < λ < 1 for zero time, for one time, for
two times and more, and for three times and more for different lotteries and conditions.








































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Boxplots of the randomization probability of choosing x, given each confidence
statement. The thick line is median, the upper and lower bars are 2nd and 3rd quantiles,
respectively. The upper panel is for the no sampling condition, and the lower panel is for
the sampling condition.
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Figure 9: Median randomization probabilities that subjects assign to x, as a function of the
value of y, for the four lotteries in the two conditions. For the simple and complex lottery,
y takes the value of Y ∈ {0, 2, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5.0, 5.5, 6, 6.5, 7, 8, 10}, for the loss lottery y is
each value in Y minus 10, and for the mixed lottery y is each value in Y minus 5.
40





































Figure 10: A boxplot of the randomization probability of choosing x across lotteries and
conditions, given each confidence statement. The thick line is median, the upper and lower
bars are 2nd and 3rd quantiles, respectively. More detailed figures for each lottery and
condition are presented in Figure 8 in Appendix.
D Additional results: the subjectivity of confidence state-
ments
In the introduction we point out that confidence statements are self-reports, and there
is no universal understanding of confidence statements such as surely, probably, or un-
sure. Therefore, these statements could have different meaning for different individuals.
To examine this hypothesis we look at the randomization probabilities at each level of
confidence. Our following result summarizes this finding.
Result 8. Given any confidence statement, there is substantial heterogeneity in the ran-
domization probability among subjects.
Support: Figure 10 gives the boxplot of the randomization probability of choosing x in
treatment 1. Figure 8 in Appendix gives the boxplots of the other treatments. As we
can clearly see, there is substantial variation of randomization probabilities across subjects
at each confidence level. As we can also see from Table 3, the standard deviation of the
randomization probabilities at each confidence level is substantial in all treatments, ranging
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from 0.11 to 0.20. The above results suggest that subjects indicating the same confidence
level chose substantially different randomization probabilities.
Result 8 does not necessarily mean confidence statements are not informative. Results 2
to 4 suggest that confidence statements are surprisingly consistent. The problem is rather
that each subject has her/his own subjective interpretation of confidence levels such as
surely or probably, which might obscure the relationship between confidence statements
and subjects’ actual behavior. Moreover, the subjective interpretation of confidence levels
might differ across tasks. For example, some subjects need to be 90% sure or higher to
make the statement of surely, others might state surely with 80% confidence. Additionally,
subjects might want to be highly certain for easy tasks to make the statement of surely,
while they can be much more tolerant for difficult tasks. These issues make between-
individual comparisons of confidence statements difficult,
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E Experimental materials
Figure 11: Welcome screen of the experiment.
43
Figure 12: Informed consent.
44
Figure 13: Introduction screen of the mixed lottery in the no sampling condition.
Figure 14: Introduction screen of the loss lottery in the sampling condition.
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Figure 15: Example of the decision screen for the binary choices and confidence statements
for the mixed lottery in the no sampling condition.
46
Figure 16: Example of the decision screen for the binary choices and confidence statements
for the loss lottery in the sampling condition.
47
Figure 17: Explanation of randomization decisions.
48
Figure 18: Example of the decision screen for the randomization choices for the complex
lottery in the no sampling condition.
49
Figure 19: Example of the decision screen for the randomization choices for the loss lottery
in the sampling condition.
50
Figure 20: Demographic questions asked at the end of the experiment.
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Confidence statements Wilcoxon tests
Condition Treatment Median Mean (sd)
Comparison Comparison
to simple to sampling
lottery condition
No sampling
Simple 4.5 4.35 (1.69) - p > 0.10
Complex 4.5 4.62 (1.91) p = 0.08 p > 0.10
Loss 4.5 4.82 (1.76) p < 0.01 p > 0.10
Mixed 5.0 5.18 (1.95) p < 0.01 p > 0.10
Sampling
Simple 4.5 4.44 (2.10) - -
Complex 4.5 4.49 (1.83) p > 0.10 -
Loss 5.0 4.85 (2.00) p < 0.05 -
Mixed 5.0 5.07 (2.21) p < 0.01 -
Randomization probability: 0 < λ < 1 Wilcoxon tests
Condition Treatment Median Mean (sd)
Comparison Comparison
to simple to sampling
lottery condition
No sampling
Simple 5.5 5.20 (1.98) - p > 0.10
Complex 5.5 5.41 (1.96) p = 0.07 p > 0.10
Loss 5.5 5.16 (2.00) p > 0.10 p > 0.10
Mixed 5.0 4.94 (2.32) p > 0.10 p > 0.10
Sampling
Simple 6.0 5.39 (2.20) - -
Complex 6.0 5.67 (2.19) p < 0.05 -
Loss 6.0 5.32 (2.23) p > 0.10 -
Mixed 6.0 5.47 (2.46) p > 0.10 -
Randomization probability: 0.15 < λ < 0.85 Wilcoxon tests
Condition Treatment Median Mean (sd)
Comparison Comparison
to simple to sampling
lottery condition
No sampling
Simple 4.0 4.03 (1.93) - p > 0.10
Complex 4.5 4.45 (1.77) p < 0.01 p > 0.10
Loss 4.0 4.05 (1.76) p > 0.10 p > 0.10
Mixed 4.5 4.08 (2.17) p > 0.10 p > 0.10
Sampling
Simple 4.5 4.32 (1.89) - -
Complex 4.5 4.60 (2.01) p = 0.06 -
Loss 4.5 4.14 (1.97) p > 0.10 -
Mixed 5.0 4.53 (2.24) p > 0.10 -
Table 9: Comparison of confidence intervals defined by confidence statements and ran-
domization probabilities across treatments and conditions. The median an mean values
are based on the confidence intervals computed for each subject. The comparison of the
lotteries is based on a one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank sum test. The comparison of the
(no) sampling conditions is based on a one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test.
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